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In its landmark 1991 decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate /Johnson Lane Corporation,1 the Supreme Court held
that a predispute agreement to arbitrate statutory claims
contained in a securities representative's registration application
was enforceable.2 This decision triggered an exponential increase
in the use of arbitration agreements3 as employers interpreted
Gilmer to authorize the insertion of such agreements into
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law School. J.D.
University of Chicago, 1990. Thanks to Douglas R. Cole and Stephen Ware for their
helpful comments and Sean Gillen for his able research assistance.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. See id. Gilmer held that an employee who signed an agreement to arbitrate
in a securities registration agreement will be required to arbitrate his Age
Discrimination in Employment claims. Subsequent courts have extended that holding
to a wide variety of statutory claims, including, among other things, claims for race
and sex discrimination. See Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39
F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994) (pregnancy discrimination); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25
F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994) (race discrimination); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (sex discrimination); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (sex discrimination).
3. Many companies have adopted or are considering adopting predispute
agreements to arbitrate. Companies such as Burlington Northern Railroad, Brown &
Root, ITT (for headquarters employees), and Rockwell International (for management
employees) have already taken this step. See Statement by Professor Samuel Estreicher
to the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations Panel on Private
Dispute Resolution Alternatives, [1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 188, at D-33 (Sept.
29, 1994); see also Mary A. Bediklan, Transforming At-Will Employment Disputes Into
Wrongful Discharge Claims: Fertile Ground For ADR, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 113, 141-42
(1993); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 83, 100 n.87 (citing studies and articles emphasizing the growth of individual
employment arbitration); Dominic Bencivenga, Mediation Boutique: Firm Provides
'Neutrals' to Settle Job Disputes, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 1996, at 5 (noting a dramatic
increase in the use of ADR since the Gilmer decision in 1991); Margaret A. Jacobs,
Judges Appear to Be Growing Skeptical of Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1994, at
B2.
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contracts with existing employees and prospective hires.4
Employers have embraced these agreements, hoping that
arbitration will deliver what it promises: inexpensive and speedy
decisionmaking, finality, and confidentiality.5 Moreover, many
employers are convinced that together with providing a more
expeditious, less expensive system of justice, arbitration will
improve their bottom line by lowering potential damage awards.6
Employers' enthusiasm for the perceived benefits of inserting
arbitration clauses into employment agreements, together with
the judicial approval of these clauses,7 ensures the continued use
of such agreements in the nonunionized workplace.'
4. See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, In=, 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
5. See Note, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes, 109
HARv. L. REV. 1670, 1673 (1996).
6. See Garry G. Mathiason, Evaluating and Using Employer-initiated Arbitration
Policies and Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the Twenty-first Century, in
EmPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS,
793, 795 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Feb. 22, 1996), available in Westlaw, CA35 ALI-
ABA 793 ("[Elmployers faced with the potential of costly employment-related
lawsuits... have been weighing alternative means of resolving such disputes in place
of trial by jury."); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 684 (1996);
Patricia Sturdevant & Dwight Golann, Should Binding Arbitration Clauses be
Prohibited in Consumer Contracts?, DISP. RESOL. MAC., Summer 1994, at 4-5 (stating
that companies use arbitration clauses to avoid juries, among other things). However,
little empirical evidence has been gathered to support the notion that arbitration
lowers damage awards.
7. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare Inc., 113 F.3d 832
(8th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
8. Although employers have used Gilmer as a justification for insertion of
arbitration agreements in conlracts of employment, that decision may be premature.
One controversial issue Gilmer did not address was whether § 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) includes within its coverage agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims between employers and employees. The FAA was designed to place arbitration
agreements on equal footing with any other contract. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Yet § 1
of the FAA limits the FAA's coverage, stating that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. § 1. The Gilmer Court did not
reach the issue whether § 1 excludes from its coverage contracts of employment
between employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce, because the
contract in Gilmer was between Gilmer and the New York Stock Exchange, not Gilmer
and his employer. If § 1 excludes contracts of employment from its coverage, those
contracts will be unenforceable unless state law indicates otherwise. See Ware, supra
note 3, at 94-95. While Gilmer did not address the § 1 issue, many other courts have.
See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471 (stating that "every circuit to consider this issue squarely
has found that section 1 of the FAA exempts only the employment contracts of workers
actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce"). Because the vast
majority of courts have held that § 1 of the FAA excludes from its coverage only the
contracts of employment of workers actually involved in transporting goods, it seems
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A certain inevitability, surrounded the emergence of
arbitration as a preferred method for resolving employment
disputes in the nonunionized sector. After all, arbitration had
long been the preferred means for resolving employment
disputes in the unionized workplace.9 Perhaps it was the
extraordinary success of arbitration in resolving disputes in the
unionized sector that precipitated nonunionized employers'
adoption of arbitration to resolve their own ever-increasing
number of employment disputes. Whatever the reason for its
increased use, arbitration of employment disputes in the
nonunionized sector is here to stay.
Although arbitration originated in organized labor and
commercial settings, in at least one respect, nonunionized
arbitration has developed more rapidly than arbitration in the
unionized sector.'" While Gilmer approved the use of predispute
agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims in the
nonunionized workplace, the use of such agreements is not
permitted in the unionized world because of the 1974 Supreme
Court decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver." In Gardner-
Denver, the issue was whether an unionized employee, who, as
required by his union's collective bargaining agreement, had
submitted his claim under the agreement's nondiscrimination
clause to final arbitration, retained the right to bring a Title VII
claim in federal court following the arbitration. The Court
determined that an unionized employee's right to a trial de novo
on a Title VII claim is not precluded by prior submission of a
claim to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement's
nondiscrimination clause.
12
The continued viability of Gardner-Denver following Gilmer
remains an open question, at least in cases where the parties
expressly agree to abide by antidiscrimination laws. Gilmer
superficially addressed Gardner-Denver's continuing validity in
response to Gilmer's argument that statutory claims could not be
unlikely that the Supreme Court would reverse direction and exclude such contracts
from the FAA's coverage.
9. See Thomas J. Piskorski and David B. Ross, Private Arbitration as the
Exclusive Means of Resolving Employment-Related Disputes, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 205,
209 (1993).
10. See generally Note, Compulsory Arbitration in the Unionized Workplace:
Reconciling Gilmer, Gardner-Denver and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 37 B.C.
L. REV. 479, 480 (1996).
11. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
12. See id. at 59-60.
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the subject of a predispute arbitration agreement.13 While the
Court concluded that Gilmer's reliance on Gardner-Denver was
misplaced, 4 its willing acceptance of arbitration as a method for
resolving statutory claims in the employment context seemed to
cry for a re-evaluation of Gardner-Denver that the Court failed to
provide. Thus, the question remained: what effect does the
Gilmer decision have, if any, on the enforceability of predispute
arbitration agreements between unions and employers?
Some commentators have suggested that Gilmer does not
provide an opportunity for revisiting Gardner-Denver.5 Yet at
least one circuit court and several district courts have used
Gilmer as the basis for enforcing an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims in a collective bargaining context. 6 Rejecting
the continued application of Gardner-Denver, the Fourth Circuit
in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,' held that a
represented employee's statutory claim, based on alleged
violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
could be arbitrated. 8 After emphasizing that the parties had
agreed that external law should govern the dispute, the Austin
Court rejected Gardner-Denver, holding that the arbitral setting
is an adequate forum for the resolution of statutory disputes
where the parties have voluntarily agreed to arbitrate their
claims.19
The Austin decision has sparked heated debate among both
bench and bar over the continuing viability of Gardner-Denver."
While the reasoning of Austin is not entirely sound, its
conclusion is correct-Gardner-Denver's absolute prohibition on
13. See Gilmer v. InterstateJohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
14. See id. at 33.
15. See Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the
Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. L3UIS U. L.J. 77, 84 (1996).
16. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.)
(enforcing executory arbitration agreement in collective bargaining context), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996); Bright v. Norshipco & Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp., 951 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Va. 1997); Brummett v. Copaz Packing Corp., 954 F.
Supp. 160 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Jessie v. Carter Health Care Center, Inc., 930 F. Supp.
1174, 1176-77 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (following Austin).
17. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.).
18. See id. at 882.
19. Id. at 880-82.
20. See Kevin P. McGowan, Labor Law: Size of Award Still Largely Determined
by State Law, Say Attorneys on ABA Panel, [1996] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at
D-16 (Aug. 13, 1996); Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire,
82 A.A. J. 58 (1996).
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arbitration of statutory claims is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's changed attitude toward the suitability of arbitration
announced in Gilmer and numerous other judicial decisions.2
Moreover, the rationale underlying Gardner-Denver, while
somewhat understandable given Gardner-Denver's facts, is no
longer compelling in cases where parties have agreed to
arbitrate their statutory claims in accordance with federal
antidiscrimination provisions. In those cases, Gilmer requires a
re-evaluation of the foundation for the decision in Gardner-
Denver.
Part II of this article conducts just such a re-evaluation, and
concludes that the bases for the Gardner-Denver decision are
unsound. Part III contends that since the reasoning of Gardner-
Denver is unsound the only remaining question is whether any
reason exists for continuing to reject collectively bargained
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Part III demonstrates
that if the "Gilmer agreement," which requires an employee, as a
condition of employment, to sign a predispute arbitration
agreement foregoing all access to jury trials, is enforceable, then
the "Gardner-Denver agreement," an agreement between the
union and employer to arbitrate employees' claims, must be
similarly enforceable. This article uses a game theoretic analysis
to argue that there is actually greater reason to enforce
"Gardner-Denver agreements" than "Gilmer agreements." Game
theory demonstrates that the structural protections inherent in
the collective bargaining context cannot be duplicated in cases
involving agreements to arbitrate individual statutory claims.
Thus, this article contends that even if Gilmer is ultimately
overturned,22  "Gardner-Denver agreements" should remain
enforceable.
II. ALEXANDER V. GARDNER-DENVER NEED NOT APPLY
In Gilmer, the Court compelled arbitration of Gilmer's age
discrimination claim because he had signed a predispute
21. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
Mitsubishi Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 477 (1989); Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
22. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements between Employers and Employees,
64 UMKC L. REv. 449 (1996) (arguing that Gilmer should be overturned).
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agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of his employment. In
an attempt to avoid arbitration, Gilmer raised a number of
issues, including his theory that statutory claims could not be
the subject of a predispute agreement. The Court rejected this
argument, as well as Gilmer's argument that arbitration
provided an inadequate forum in which to vindicate statutory
rights because of its lack of procedural safeguards.23
Emphasizing how the judicial attitude toward arbitration had
changed since the days of Wilko v. Swan24 and Gardner-Denver,
the Court enforced the arbitration agreement. In addition, the
Court rejected Gilmer's claims that the agreement should not be
enforced because it was the result of unequal bargaining power.25
Gilmer has prompted commentators and courts alike to
reconsider the Gardner-Denver ruling.26 In the aftermath of
Gilmer, some courts have taken the decision at face value,
concluding that Gardner-Denver is still good law.27 Other courts
23. Gilmer also argued, among other things, that arbitral procedures were
insufficient to protect his rights. Gilmer claimed that the arbitrators were biased in
favor of the employer, and that the limited discovery available was insufficient as was
the lack of written opinions. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31.
24. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), rev'd, Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481. In Wilko, the Court
held that a predispute agreement to arbitrate a claim arising under § 12(2) of the
Securities Act was unenforceable because a judicial forum was necessary to protect the
substantive rights created by the Securities Act on behalf of investors. The Wilko
court's decision rested primarily on its belief that arbitration was inadequate to enforce
statutory rights. Thus, where the arbitral forum provides insufficient protection to
statutory rights, Wilko commands that the statute's beneficiaries be permitted to access
a judicial forum. Since the 1980s, however, the Court has never found the arbitral
forum an inadequate venue for vindication of statutory rights.
25. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. It is surprising that the Court did not use Gilmer
to reconsider Gardner-Denver. It seems counterintuitive that Gilmer should endorse
enforcement of arbitration agreements between parties with disparate negotiating
incentives-employers and employees-while it continues, following Gardner-Denver,
to reject wholesale the agreements reached by parties with similar negotiating
incentives-unions and employers. Without significant consideration, the Gilmer Court,
and the majority of courts addressing this question since Gilmer, rest the decision not
to enforce the collective preference of a unionized workforce on Gardner-Denver's
holding that statutory employment claims are independent from a collective bargaining
agreement's arbitration procedure. This issue will be considered in greater depth in
Part III of this article.
26. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997);
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Michele Hoyman and Lamont E.
Stallworth, The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-
Denver, 39 ARB. J. 49 (1984) (calling for Gardner-Denver's reversal long before Gilmer
was decided); Malin, supra note 15.
27. See, e.g., Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 522-23; Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1437; Pryner,
109 F.3d 354; Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1995); Humphrey v. Council
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have concluded that Gardner-Denver is inconsistent with the
principles Gilmer advocated and have, therefore, used Gilmer to
reject Gardner-Denver.'s Analyzing Gardner-Denver in light of
Gilmer demonstrates that many of the reasons offered in support
of Gardner-Denver were wrong when proffered; other reasons,
such as the unsuitability of the arbitral forum to resolve
statutory claims, no longer correctly state the law. Given the
changed perception of arbitration and the lack of remaining
justifications for the Gardner-Denver decision, where the parties
have agreed to resolve their statutory claims using external
antidiscrimination law, Gardner-Denver should be reversed.
The Gardner-Denver Court confronted and resolved four
separate issues in reaching its conclusion. The Court's first
concern was whether an unionized employee's right to a trial de
novo on his Title VII claim should be precluded because of his
prior submission of the dispute to an arbitrator.29 Second, the
Court expressed reservations about the adequacy of the arbitral
forum as a substitute for litigation. 0 Third, in a footnote, the
Court raised the concern that the interests of the individual
might be subordinated to those of the group if the union were
permitted to waive an employee's right to select a forum.3'
Finally, the Court suggested that an employee's right to be free
from racial discrimination is an individual statutory right that
the union is not authorized to waive.2
of Jewish Fed'n, 901 F. Supp. 703, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Jackson v. Quanex Corp.,
889 F. Supp. 1007, 1010-11 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Randolph v. Cooper Indus., 879 F. Supp.
518, 520-22 (W.D. Pa. 1994); Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380, 384-87 (N.D. Ind.
1994).
28. See cases cited supra notes 16-17, 21.
29. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1974). Unlike Gilmer
which involved a nonunionized employee's contractual agreement with his employer to
arbitrate statutory claims, Gardner-Denver involved a collective bargaining agreement,
negotiated by Gardner-Denver's union and his employer. This agreement required that
any disputes between employees and the employer regarding the application of the
agreement go through a grievance arbitration process. The grievance arbitration would
then resolve the dispute by determining what the agreement means. See Theodore J.
St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1977) ("Put most simply, the
arbitrator is the parties' officially designated 'reader' of the contract. He (or she) is
their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is
necessary to handle the unanticipated omissions of the intial agreement.").
30. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58.
31. See id. at 58 n.19.
32. See id. at 51-52.
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The Gilmer Court rejected Gardner-Denver to the extent that
it rested on the ground that arbitration was inferior to litigation
for the resolution of statutory claims. According to the Court,
[I]n our recent arbitration cases we have already rejected most
of these arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitration of
statutory claims. Such generalized attacks on arbitration "res[t]
on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be
complainants," and as such, they are "far out of step with our
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes."33
The Court also stated, "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve its remedial
and deterrent function."34
Yet the decision in Gilmer agreed with Gardner-Denver's
theory that a potential disparity in interests between the union
and an employee means that subsequent litigation of a statutory
claim is permissible.35 Moreover, the Gilmer Court reiterated its
belief that collective bargaining arbitration involved contractual,
not statutory rights. 6 The Court also espoused the Gardner-
Denver theory that the union has the power to waive collective
rights, but not individual rights." Thus, the Gilmer Court
concluded that: Gardner-Denver remains good law because
Gilmer involved an express agreement to arbitrate statutory
33. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
34. I& at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)).
35. See id. at 34. The Gilmer court notes both the existence of a potential
disparity in interests as well as "tension between collective representation and
individual statutory rights." Md2 at 35. One assumes that the "tension" results from the
fear that the union will make collective choices that deviate from the interests of
certain individuals within the group. In other words, the "tension" is based on the
potential disparity in interests between the union and its members. Id. Because these
two concepts are based on the same concern, the union acting detrimentally to
individual interests, they will be discussed as one concern rather than two.
36. See id. at 34. In the unionized environment, the grievance arbitrator
interprets the collective bargaining agreement to resolve union-management disputes.
Historically, the arbitrator was not empowered to resolve noncontractual disputes and
did not utilize external law, i.e., case law or statutes, to assist her in resolving the
dispute.
37. See id. Collective rights are those rights which are created by the existence
of a union, such as the right to strike or the right to arbitrate grievances. Individual
rights are those rights an employee has in the absence of union representation.
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claims while Gardner-Denver's agreement extended only to
contract-based claims.38
Following Gilmer, then, the remaining justifications for
denying enforcement of collectively bargained predispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are that (1) the
potential disparity in interests between a union and an employee
prohibits the enforcement of the agreement; (2) the union's
ability to waive the collective rights of its constituents does not
include the ability to waive an employee's statutory right to
select a forum for the adjudication of his or her statutory
discrimination claim; (3) the labor arbitrator has no authority to
resolve statutory disputes; and (4) labor arbitrators are experts
in resolving contractual disputes, not statutory ones. Careful
examination of each of these concerns establishes that they are
inadequate as justifications for rejecting collectively bargained
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, especially in light of
the Court's strong preference for enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
A. The Disparity Between the Interests of the Union and the
Represented Employee is Insignificant
The Court, both in Gardner-Denver and later in Gilmer,
raised the important concern that the union, as labor's exclusive
representative, might use its power to bargain to the detriment
of the interests of a certain employee or group of employees. 9
The theory is that unions might sacrifice individual or protected
groups' preferences in order to obtain benefits for the majority.
38. The Gilmer court also stated that while Gilmer arose under the FAA,
Gardner-Denver did not. While it is true that courts believe the FAA reflects the
"'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,'" id. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 625), this liberal policy is hardly limited to those agreements that the FAA
governs. Since the Steelworkers trilogy, courts have been quite willing to enforce
collectively bargained agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise between labor and
management. Moreover, the Court has suggested that while the FAA does not govern
collective bargaining arbitration, courts may look to it for guidance. See United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987).
39. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 58
n.19 (1974); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362-63 (7th Cir. 1997).
Commentators also recognize this possibility. See Marion Crain, Between Feminism and
Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903,
1907 (1994); Mayer G. Freed et al., Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective
Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 466 (1983) (stating that once a union becomes the
exclusive representative, it "has the power to conclude bargains detrimental to the
interests of a particular employee or group of employees").
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By definition, exclusive representation involves individual
employee sacrifice.4" It is theoretically possible that, as a large
entity, the union might have prejudices or, at the least, be more
interested in responding to, and satisfying, the needs of the
majority. Moreover, as an elected entity, the union may
recognize that if it is able to increase the number and type of
claims it handles, it will become more powerful.4' The union's
desire to increase its importance to the employees and thereby
become indispensable may contribute to its motivation to give
away the rights of individuals too easily. The question then is
whether the union's ability to disregard or bargain away
protected groups' interests should invalidate a collectively
bargained agreement to arbitrate statutory discrimination
claims.
1. Public choice theory suggests that protected group interests
are not compromised
It is entirely possible that protected groups-those whose
rights are protected by antidiscrimination statutes-actually
receive greater attention and representation from the union than
does the majority. Unions may be more responsive to the needs
of the protected classes because they articulate those concerns to
the union while the majority remains silent.
This is an application of the theory of public choice. Public
choice theory involves the application of microeconomics and
game theory to legislative decisionmaking.42 While public choice
theory has typically focused on the production of law by
legislators, regulatory agencies and courts, the theory applies
equally well to any large, elected group that must respond to its
constituency. Public choice theorists explain that the
compromises reached by legislators, as codified in statutes,
depend, in great part, upon the influence of special interest
groups. Theoretically, the groups with greatest influence are
40. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (recognizing that the union
is the exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees within the appropriate
bargaining unit); Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362 ("An agreement negotiated by the union
elected by a majority of workers in the bargaining unit binds all members of the unit
41. In a grievance procadure, the union represents the aggrieved employee. See
MARTIN H. MALuN, INDimuAL RiGHTs wrrI-N THE UNION 384 (1988).
42. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241, 250 (1992).
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those who can organize easily to promote their ends. To develop
an effective political coalition an organizing group must be able
to reduce informational and organizational costs. Otherwise, the
costs of creating the organization will be prohibitive. As
Professor Frickey emphasizes, the groups most likely to organize
and influence the legislature are those who can minimize
organization costs by identifying similarly situated individuals.'
Protected groups are more likely to succeed in organizing due to
an ease of identification and because they are more "likely to
receive discrete benefits or suffer disproportionate burdens ...
than the diffuse public."" As a result, Frickey predicts that "lots"
of statutes provide "concentrated, unjustified benefits to small
groups at the expense of the general public."45
The theory of public choice arose to explain legislative results
that seemed to prefer the interests of the political minority to
those of the political majority. Public choice explained such
results using the theory of "interest group capture" articulated
above. To apply public choice theory in the union setting requires
proof that unions act like legislatures when making decisions. In
the context of public choice analysis, this requires a showing that
the union's decisions reflect a preference for the political
minority at the expense of the political majority. This proof, if it
exists, can be obtained by examination of the analogue to the
"legislation" produced by the union-the "collective bargaining
agreement"--as well as other quantifiable union activities, such
as lobbying.
The universal inclusion of nondiscrimination clauses in
collective bargaining agreements would seem to suggest
protected group capture. So too would the continuing union
efforts to eliminate sexual discrimination,46 and fetal protection
policies.47 More recently, union efforts on behalf of the disabled
culminated in the passage of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, demonstrating the powerful influence of protected groups.4
43. See id.
44. Id. at 250-51. Title VII was passed to eliminate disproportionate burdens
suffered by minorities and to provide them with discrete benefits.
45. Id. at 251.
46. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME
v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 609 F.
Supp. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
47. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
48. See Mary K O'Melveny, The Americans With Disabilities Act and Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 Ky.
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Judicial decisions also reflect union efforts on behalf of
protected groups. In one famous case, United Steelworkers v.
Weber,49 the Supreme Court considered the validity of an
affirmative action plan which created a training program and
reserved fifty percent of the program's positions for black
employees. The program was intended to eliminate the racial
imbalances in the employer's skilled craft positions. The Court
upheld the plan against a challenge by a white employee. For
purposes of this article, it is important to note only that the
program was developed at the behest of the union. The union's
behavior demonstrates some evidence of a protected group's
ability to influence union decisionmaking.
Similarly, in another well known case, Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,"0 the Court considered a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement that retained probationary
minority employees during layoffs over nonminority employees
with greater seniority. While this provision was ultimately
stricken, this case highlights unions' efforts on behalf of
protected groups.
Risks of marginalization and erasure of protected classes by
unions exist-historically, unions were hardly thought of as
protectors of minority rights. Yet even commentators who
believe that unions tend to favor majority interests, concede that
many unions have "attempted to foster gender consciousness as
well as class consciousness through their organizing and
pressure strategies," and that "the labor movement has done
more than any other social institution to improve women's
economic status."5 ' Thus unions, who at first blush would seem
more likely to marginalize protected groups, may in fact do much
to advance minority interests.
Applying public choice theory to the operation of unions, one
would expect to see groups who may suffer disproportionately if
predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are included
in collective bargaining agreements organizing and using their
influence to ensure that the union does not concede their right to
L.J. 219, 220 (1993).
49. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
50. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
51. Crain, supra note 39, at 1960. But see Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving
and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L. Rsv. 779, 796 (1992) (stating that while
all employees benefit from unions, unions historically discriminated frequently on the
basis of race).
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bring statutory claims in federal court. After all, organization is
not difficult because protected groups can identify potential
members and define interests easily. The protected groups share
the well-defined interest of wishing to avoid the detrimental
effects discrimination potentially causes. Moreover, the
protected groups tend to be small. This helps such groups
overcome potential free-rider problems5" and concentrates the
benefits of the union's actions to create strong incentives for the
group to lobby for beneficial results.
A concern that may arise when public choice theory is
applied to nonlegislative decisionmaking is whether the
protected classes will be able to convince their elected
representatives that they should act in the protected group's
interest. In the legislative process, this goal is accomplished with
pledges of money for reelection campaigns and public support,
among other promises. In the union setting, contributions of
money are not likely to occur. Yet members of unions wield
significant power. Under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), a petition for a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
representation can be filed by unions, employers, or the
employees themselves.53 In order to file a representation
petition, a union must first demonstrate that a substantial
number of employees support the union. 4 If the NLRB believes
that at least thirty percent of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit support the union, it will call for an election.55 In
that election process, a rival union can obtain a position on the
ballot upon the showing of the support of just a single
52. In large group decisionmaking, any single person's actions will have an
infintesimal effect on the outcome. As a result, a rational person will try to "free-ride"
i.e., expend no effort, in the hope of benefitting from other people's actions. See DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23 (1991). In smaller groups,
such as protected groups, the incentive to act increases, thus reducing the "free-rider"
problem because there is a greater likelihood that any one individual's actions will
change the outcome. See id.
53. In the absence of any bars to election, a petition for an NLRB representation
election can be filed regardless of whether the employees are currently represented or
have never been represented. See Comtel Sys. Tech., Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 287 (1991);
John Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987).
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1996). NLRB procedures for representation
proceedings are set forth at 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60-72 (1996). Signed, dated authorization
cards satisfy the requirement of support. See Custom Bent Glass Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 373
(1991).
55. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1994).
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employee. 56 If the rival union wants full intervention in the
representation hearing, it need only show that ten percent of the
employees support it.
57
Because the NLRA's requirements for appearing on a ballot
in an election are minimal, the protected class that is able to
organize has a great deal of power to influence the kinds of
provisions adopted in the negotiation process. The influence of a
protected class is enhanced by its ability to threaten the
incumbent union every twelve months to three years.5 s With
such frequent challenges possible, a union that wishes to remain
in power must pay attention to organized groups. Failure to
attend to their needs might very well result in a change of
leadership to a rival union more interested in satisfying the
needs of the protected group. This result is made more likely
because, as in the legislative process, the majority is likely to
remain unorganized and, thus, without a voice.
In another way, the case for application of public choice
theory to union decisionmaking is even more compelling than it
is in the legislative process. Commentators have repeatedly
expressed concern with the ability of the public choice theory to
explain legislative outcomes. The possibility always exists that a
statute will be intentionally, or unintentionally, misconstrued
during the judicial review process or, before that, substantially
changed through the Congressional committee system.59 The
legislation might also receive a Presidential veto or may be
delegated to an administrative agency for further
consideration.60 The possibility that proposed legislation will be
substantially altered or misinterpreted decreases the incentive
of the interest group to influence the legislation. Yet public
choice theory remains a popular method for explaining
legislation.
56. See JAlMS B. ATLESON ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 146-47
(1978).
57. See id.
58. Once a new union is elected, rival unions are barred from challenging the
incumbent union for at least twelve months. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1994). If the
incumbent union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement that lasts three or more
years, rival unions are barred from challenging the incumbent union for three years.
See LABOR LAw CASES AND MATERALuS 273 (Archibald Cox et al. eds., 1990).
59. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the
Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 56 (1988).
60. See id. at 59.
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Although similar problems exist in the union setting, the
opportunities for misinterpretation are greatly reduced. A
protected group interested in particular "legislation" in the
collective bargaining agreement need only concern itself with the
possibilities that management will change the proposed
provision or that an arbitrator might subsequently misinterpret
it. The reviewing court might also commit error, but this
possibility is not significant because only limited judicial review
is available. While these are real possibilities, the universe of
potential effects in the union setting is smaller than the
possibility of alteration of legislation in the legislative process.
Thus, the protected groups' incentives to influence union
"legislation" is at least as strong as an interest group's incentive
to influence legislation.
While empirical evidence supporting application of public
choice theory to unions has not been gathered, in at least one
well-known NLRB decision, the Board recognized the analogies.
In Jubilee Manufacturing Co.,61 the Board stated that the effect
of employer discrimination might "cause minorities to coalesce,
and it is possible that this could lead to collective action with
nonminority group union members." 2 The Board emphasized
that given their organizational ability, the minority groups,
acting alone, should have the strength to eliminate
discriminatory practices by the employer.6"
Applying public choice theory in the union setting, one would
predict that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims would not
be included in collective bargaining agreements if the well-
organized protected groups believed that such agreements were
not in their best interest. Because these agreements are
becoming more frequent rather than less, the protected groups
may well believe that such agreements are not disadvantageous.
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination against protected groups
In the absence of empirical evidence supporting the
application of public choice theory to union action, concerns that
the union will prefer majority interests at the expense of
61. 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 272-73.
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protected groups may still be overcome by two alternative
legislative protections against union abuse of the power. Both
the duty of fair representation and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ensure that the union's increased power will not be
accompanied by an increase in discrimination against protected
groups.
a. The duty of fair representation. The duty of fair
representation (DFR) obligates the union to represent fairly all
members of the bargaining unit and process grievances in good
faith, without hostility or discriminatory intent.14 While courts
give unions fairly wide latitude in negotiating agreements and
resolving grievances, in order to avoid liability for breaching the
DFR, the union must provide a legitimate and rational
explanation for its conduct.65 In determining whether the union's
decisions are reasonable, courts consider the basis for the union's
decision. If the union's decision is based on "impermissible" or
"invidious" factors, the union is held to be in breach of its duty.
"Impermissible factors" include the members' race, sex, national
origin, political positions or status as union members. To the
extent that most nondiscrimination clauses in collective
bargaining agreements have been expanded to include other
protected statuses, union decisionmaking that relied upon such
information is likely to be considered a breach as well.66
Courts hold that the fair representation duty imposes on
labor unions both the duty not to discriminate and an
"affirmative duty to take corrective steps to ensure compliance
with Title VII." 7 Thus, the fair representation duty, at least in
the context of members' discrimination claims in contract
negotiation and administration, imposes a significant burden on
the union to avoid even the appearance of discriminatory
decisionmaking.
Some commentators criticize judicial analysis of the fair
representation duty, suggesting that the courts' limited judicial
64. See Vaca v. Sipes, 366 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan, 345
U.S. 330 (1953).
65. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O7eill, 499 U.S. 65, 72 (1991); Ryan v. Printing
Pressman Local No. 2, 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979); Figueroa De Arroyo v. Sindicata
De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970).
66. See Connye Y. Harper, Origin and Nature of the Duty of Fair Representation,
12 LAB. L.J. 183, 184-85 (1996).
67. Id. at 187 (citing Dcnnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1978)).
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review of DFR challenges renders the DFR ineffective.6"
According to the critics, the "DFR" is meaningless because it is
based on a principle of "fairness" that is extremely difficult to
judge.6 9 Thus, in their view, the DFR rarely results in the
second-guessing of union decisions.70
While judicial review of DFR violations is a potential
problem, this criticism is less compelling when the union's
actions result in discrimination against a discrete group. Where
a union relies on "invidious factors" such as those articulated in
Title VII, courts are quick to find a DFR violation.7' Moreover,
judicial understanding of the nature and scope of the "invidious"
categories makes it easy for courts to find a DFR breach.72 Thus,
concerns that union decisions are rarely struck down on the
principle of distributive fairness should not affect the vitality of
the DFR claim as a means to limit discrimination against
protected classes, at least when the union's decision is based on
an invidious factor. Instead, the good faith duty stands as a bar
to the union's ability to prefer majority interests.
b. Title VII protection. If the duty of fair representation
were insufficient to ensure that the union did not discriminate
against any of its members, Title VII provides overlapping
protection to employees against union discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.73 While the
union is still occasionally a defendant in a Title VII action
68. See Freed et al., supra note 39, at 466.
69. See id.
70. In that sense, critics' complaints about the DFR sound very similar to critics'
complaints about the business judgment rule in corporate law. The business judgment
rule is a specific application of a directorial standard of conduct to the situation where
a business decision is made by disinterested and independent directors on an informed
basis with a good faith belief that the decision will benefit the corporation. Should the
shareholders sue the directors on the basis that their decision was illegitimate, the
court examines the decision only to the extent necessary to verify the presence of a
business decision, disinterestedness and independence, due care, good faith and the
absence of an abuse of discretion. If these elements are present-and they are
presumed to be-the court will not second guess the merits of the decision. See
generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE: FmUCiARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORs (4th ed. 1993).
71. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (holding
that a union could not deprive blacks of membership without breaching its duty of fair
representation); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (holding that discrimination
against blacks is a breach of the duty of fair representation).
72. Discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, sex, color, religion, or
national origin is considered "invidious" discrimination. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(2)(c) (1994).
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instituted by an employee,74 more often the union's role has been
as an active player in the effort to eliminate unlawful
employment discrimination in the workplace. Many labor unions
have advocated vociferously for the elimination of sexual
discrimination,75 disability discrimination and fetal protection
policies.76
When the union has discriminated, courts do not hesitate to
impose liability under Title VII.77 Courts also emphasize that
Title VII not only imposes a duty on unions to avoid active
discrimination, but also to eliminate existing discriminatory
practices.78
This is not to suggest that unions have resolved the dilemma
of responding to majority needs while still protecting minorities
or that unions are never guilty of racial discrimination. Yet it
would seem that in light of the severe penalties that can be
imposed for discriminatory behavior, unions would have little
incentive to negotiate an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims
if such an agreement could be considered discriminatory. As
Samuel Estreicher noted, under current law, an employee
claiming inadequate union representation may disregard the
collective bargaining agreement's finality provisions and go
directly to court.79 Consequently, the union will be forced to
defend its decision to negotiate a clause or process a grievance in
74. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Daniels v. Pipefitters
Ass'n Local Union, 945 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1991); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers Intl
Union, 778 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
75. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Iinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME
v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 609 F.
Supp. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
76. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
77. For example, in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Company, 482 U.S. 656 (1987), the
Court held a union liable under Title VII for its knowing refusal to pursue grievances
of black members who complained of racial discrimination and harassment by the
employer. Similarly, in Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n. Local Union No. 597, 945 F.2d 906
(7th Cir. 1991), the Court found a union liable for its back door hiring hall policies
which disproportionately excluded blacks from job referrals.
78. The Fifth Circuit held that both the union's DFR and Title VII were violated
when it failed to take "every reasonable step" to eliminate a discriminatory seniority
system. See Terrell v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981).
Both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have imposed an affirmative duty on unions
to eliminate discriminatory contractual provisions during negotiations. See Freeman v.
Motor Convoy, 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983); Wattleten v. Intl Bhd. of Boilermakers,
686 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (11th
Cir. 1982).
79. See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening
Up the Possibilities for Value-.Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 844 (1996).
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front of a jury at its own expense. If a breach is ultimately found,
the union will have to pay damages. Because unions are
organizations with limited resources, it would not be surprising
for them to avoid the risk of trial on a DFR or Title VII claim
even if the consequence is overprotecting protected classes.,,
B. The Union May Waive the Right of Its Members to Select a
Forum for the Airing of Discrimination Claims
Another objection to the enforcement of a union's agreement
to arbitrate its members' statutory claims is that the union only
has the power to waive collective rights, such as the right to
strike, and not the power to waive individual rights, such as the
right to select a forum for the airing of a Title VII discrimination
claim. In Austin, the Fourth Circuit stated that the union's
power to waive the right to strike and other rights protected by
the NLRA,8' included the power to exchange the right to a forum
for statutory claims for some other benefit.8 2 The Fourth Circuit
believed that the employees' designation of the union as their
representative empowered the union to bargain all terms and
conditions of employment, including agreements to arbitrate
employee's statutory claims. Since the employees voluntarily
elect the union, the court reasoned, the agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims is also voluntary and, therefore, enforceable.
According to the dissent, a labor union cannot waive a
member's right to a judicial forum for a statutory claim because
that right belongs to the individual.' According to the dissent,
the power to waive collective rights does not include the power to
waive individual ones.8' The supposition underlying the dissent's
position in Austin and the Court's position in Gardner-Denver is
that a union's agreement with the employer to arbitrate
individual employees' statutory claims is invalid because the
individual is not offered the opportunity to waive his right to a
forum. In other words, only the individual can waive forum
80. See id.
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
82. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
83. See id. at 886-87 (Hall, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 887 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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selection and the selection of the union as bargaining agent does
not constitute such a waiver.es
By contrast, the Gilmer Court clearly stated that an
arbitration agreement signed by an employee as a condition of
employment is a legitimate waiver of the employee's right to a
forum. In the securities industry, where Gilmer worked,
arbitration agreements in individual employees' contracts are
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The only alternative to
signing such an agreement is turning down the job. 6 This
concern is magnified for securities industry employees because
all jobs in that industry require the signing of such an
agreement. The decision to reject the arbitration agreement is
the decision to work outside the securities industry. Yet in
Gilmer and subsequent decisions, courts have emphasized that
the fact that the agreement is a condition of employment does
not render the agreement unenforceable. Such agreements are
routinely enforced in the securities industry and have been
rejected only once outside the securities industry.'
Supporters of Gardner-Denver argue that it is the ability of
the employee to refuse the agreement that makes his waiver
meaningful. Interestingly, the choices presented to the
represented employee are remarkably similar to those presented
to the "Gilmer employee." Once an employee becomes aware that
the union and the employer have agreed to arbitrate employees'
statutory claims, the employee has the following options: abide
by the union's agreement or look for another job. This is the
identical dilemma unrepresented employees face. Yet the basis
85. Martin Malin identifies this issue as the single most important reason why
Gilmer does not compel reexamination of Gardner-Denver. According to Malin, however
meaningless a "Gilmer employee's" waiver is, the opportunity to reject the waiver
provides the "Gilmer employee" the ability to "negotiat[e] a separate deal with [his]
employer which did not require arbitration." Malin, supra note 15. By contrast, a
"Gardner-Denver" employee has no such "choice". Unionized employees do not have the
ability to negotiate separate deals with employers. See id.
86. There is always the possibility, however miniscule, that the employee could
negotiate with the employer to eliminate the clause. In reality, these clauses are
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Even highly skilled employees are unable to
negotiate the elimination of these clauses. This controversial policy is currently being
reexamined by the NASD. See Patrick McGeehan, Big Panel is Formed by NASD,
WALL ST. J., May 29, 1997, at C-1. Possible recommendations include leaving the
arbitration requirement alone or making it optional. See id. at C-3.
87. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to enforce agreement to arbitrate statutory claims because the employees did
not "knowingly" agree to arbitrate).
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for the Gilmer Court's decision to enforce such agreements as
voluntary is the understanding that every employee has the
option to reject the arbitration agreement when it is offered.
Represented employees are offered the same choices: to continue
working under the agreement to arbitrate statutory claims or
look for another job. The distinction Gilmer attempts to draw
between the choices of represented employees and
unrepresented employees is empty formalism and should be
rejected. If the "Gilmer agreement" waiver has legal significance,
so too should the union's waiver of a right to a forum for
adjudication of its members' statutory claims.
At the time Gardner-Denver was decided, the concept of
using the grievance arbitration machinery to resolve a statutory
discrimination claim was unthinkable. Yet in the twenty years
since the Gardner-Denver ruling, the acceptance of arbitration as
a means of resolving statutory disputes and the recognition of
arbitrators as potential experts in employment law issues has
increased dramatically. Absent evidence that a union is
derogating its minority members' interests in favor of majority
desires, there is no justification for ignoring the parties' wish to
resolve statutory disputes in arbitration. That the represented
employee does not have the option to reject an arbitration
provision should not prove troublesome since all employees are
offered the same choice: take the agreement or leave the job.
Since the bases for Gardner-Denver have eroded over time, it
should be overruled. As has been shown above, none of the
reasons Gilmer cited in opposition to the use of predispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory rights are valid concerns in
the union setting.
C. Arbitrators Are Authorized to Utilize External Law When
Interpreting the Collective Bargaining Agreement if the Parties
Have Agreed to It
In Gardner-Denver, the Court emphasized that when an
employee submits his grievance to arbitration, he seeks to
vindicate his contractual rights, not his statutory rights.8
According to the Court, statutory rights are independent of the
contract, and must be adjudicated separately even if they arise
88. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974).
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from the same factual occurrence." It is crucial to note that
while the Gardner-Denver collective bargaining agreement
contained a standard nondiscrimination clause,' it did not
expressly require statutory claims to be arbitrated. As a result,
for purposes of Gardner-Denver, the Court was right-the
parties agreed only to arbitrate contractual disputes. What the
Gilmer Court subsequently misunderstood when it confronted
the identical issue, is that grievance arbitration is not always
limited to resolving contractual disputes; parties to collective
bargaining agreements can agree to arbitrate noncontractual
diputes. While they rarely did so in 1974, it has become
increasingly common to see parties agreeing to arbitrate
statutory disputes.9 In these agreements, the parties agree that
the arbitrator will apply "external law"--the same law a court
would apply were it resolving the dispute. As a result,
arbitrators have become more comfortable interpreting and
applying Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes.92 Thus,
it is no longer true that grievance arbitration is a forum solely
for the resolution of contractual claims.
It is essential for parties who wish to resolve their disputes
using external law to make that intention clear in the language
of the collective bargaining agreement. Where the parties choose
to incorporate external law into their agreement, the arbitrator
is required to interpret and apply that law.93 This was true even
in the days of Gardner-Denver. In the absence of a stated
intention, an arbitrator should reject external law because his
principal task is to interpret and apply the terms of the contract.
If it is not clear that the parties wish to use external law to
89. See id. at 50.
90. Article 5, section 2 of the collective bargaining agreement governing
Alexander provided that, "there shall be no discrimination against any employee on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry." Gardner-Denver, 415
U.S. at 39.
91. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., 78 U.S. 875 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996); Bright v. Norshipco & Norfolk Shipbuilding, 951 F.
Supp. 95 (E.D. Va. 1997); Brummett v. Copaz Packing Corp., 954 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.
Ohio 1996); see also Thomas E. Terrill, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Labor
Arbitration: Recent Awards, 48 LAB. L.J. 3, 4 (1997) (emphasizing that numerous
arbitrators resolve statutory claims in addition to contractual ones because the parties
request it).
92. See Terrill, supra note 91, at 16-17.
93. See ARNOLD M. ZACK & RICHARD I. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION
AND ARBITRATION 37-39 (2d ed. 1995).
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resolve the dispute, the arbitrator will be prohibited from using
it.
The debate questioning the propriety of using external law to
assist arbitrators in interpretation of an agreement arose
because most agreements contained broadly drawn contractual
provisions rather than specific commands regarding the use of
external law to resolve disputes.9 In such cases, the courts
decided to leave to the arbitrators the decision whether external
law should be used to resolve disputes.95 The Court in United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., suggested that
an arbitrator could look beyond the agreement to the external
law for assistance in "determining the sense of the agreement."
9 7
At the same time, it emphasized that an arbitrator must still
look to the collective bargaining agreement and draw the
"essence" of any award from the agreement, not external law. 8
But Enterprise Wheel involved a broadly written clause, not a
clause that specifically articulated which external laws the
arbitrator was to consider. Where the contract states that the
parties will comply with external laws prohibiting discrimination
and that disputes regarding discrimination claims will be
arbitrated, the ambiguity surrounding the arbitrator's
interpretive role is reduced. 9 In such a case, the arbitrator is not
94. A broadly drawn provision does not specify whether an arbitrator should
utilize external law in resolving disputes. A more narrowly drawn clause indicates
whether the arbitrator should use external law. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER
ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WoRKs 382-83 (4th ed. 1985).
95. Even in cases with broadly drafted arbitration clause, a "significantly greater
number of arbitrators" resolving claims of discrimination "have considered Title VII
doctrine in deciding" such cases. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 94, at 382. In
interpreting an agreemenfs prohibition against "discrimination as to age, sex, marital
status, race, color, creed, national origin or political affiliation," id. at 383, Arbitrator
Roumell indicated that where the agreement fails to define discrimination
one must look to the law as it is being developed under applicable statutes
by the courts of the land for a definition. When the parties use a phrase such
as 'discrimination as to ... creed,' they presumably are incorporating the
applicable law on that subject into their contract. As to the issue of religious
discrimination in employment, the law is set forth in Title VII.
Id.
96. 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960).
97. Id at 597.
98. Id. at 597-98.
99. This was the case in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d
875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996), the only federal appellate court case
to hold that an unionized employee will be bound by the union's agreement to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims. In Austin, the collective bargaining agreement
contained a provision that stated:
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simply authorized to utilize external law; the arbitrator must
use external law when resolving the dispute." °
The parties may go even further. In Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 1 the collective bargaining
agreement stated that the arbitrator was to resolve disputes
that arise under federal antidiscrimination laws.102 If the parties
authorize it and are satisfied that they can find an arbitrator
capable of interpreting those laws, there is no legitimate basis
for prohibiting arbitrators from resolving these disputes. 10 3 Thus,
the statement in Gardner-Denver, that arbitration is designed to
resolve disputes involving contractual rights and not statutory
rights, is simply inaccurate.104  Concerns regarding the
arbitrator's power to decide cases using external law provide no
basis for disturbing the parties' agreement. 0 5
1. The Company and Lhe Union will comply with all laws preventing
discrimination against any employee because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, handicap or veteran status.
2. This Contract shall be administered in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act....
3. Any disputes under this Article . . . shall be subject to the grievance
procedure.
Id. at 879-80.
100. As Zack & Bloch emphasize, "[i]f. .. the parties have chosen to incorporate
external law into their agreement, the arbitrator must interpret and apply that law."
ZACK & BLOCH, supra note 93, at 28-29.
101. 78 F.3d at 875.
102. See id. at 880-81.
103. In Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir.
1997), the D.C. Circuit suggested that when parties explicitly authorize an arbitrator
to resolve a dispute using a statute, public law is only "relevant to determining what
contractual rights the parties enjoy." Id. at 1475. According to Cole, adjudication of a
statutory dispute is an implementation of the contract, not a resolution of the statutory
claim. This view is extremely formalistic. If a labor arbitrator is requested to resolve
an employee's Title VII claim, his interpretation necessarily resolves both the
contractual issue and the statutory one. No purpose is served by permitting relitigation
of the statutory claim in a subsequent federal court proceeding. In the absence of any
evidence that arbitrators did not understand the law they were to interpret, it is
senseless to provide the employee with an opportunity to relitigate the same issues.
104. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974).
105. In Gilmer, the plaintiff raised a different objection to an arbitrator using
external law to resolve his statutory claim. According to the plaintiff in Gilmer,
statutory claims cannot be adjudicated in arbitration because Congress intended for
such claims to be aired in a judicial forum. The Gilmer Court rejected that argument,
stating that once parties have contracted to arbitrate a statutory matter, the parties
should be held to that agreement unless Congress intended to prohibit arbitration of
that matter. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
According to Gilmer, "fi]f such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text
of the [statute], its legislative history, or an Inherent conflict' between arbitration and
the [statute's] underlying purposes." Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v.
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D. Labor Arbitrators are Experts in Statutory Disputes as Well
as Contractual Disputes
According to the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver, a major
impediment to the enforcement of arbitration agreements
between unions and employers is that the arbitrators chosen to
resolve these disputes are educated in the "law of the shop"
rather than the "law of the land." °" If arbitrators are not
competent to analyze and decide statutory claims, then the
propriety of expanding the arbitrator's role as an interpreter of
law would be questionable.
Although the Gilmer Court did not address arbitrators'
ability to interpret statutes in resolving disputes between
represented employees and employers, it quite clearly
authorized arbitrators to resolve exactly these questions when
unrepresented employees and employers are involved.
Arbitrators for labor arbitration and private employment
disputes are drawn from the same pool, typically the American
Arbitration Association. Thus, there is no reason to think that
the arbitrator who resolves disputes between the unrepresented
employee and his employer is any less qualified to resolve the
identical dispute when a represented employee raises it.
That the Gilmer Court empowered arbitrators to resolve
statutory disputes does not answer the question of whether
arbitrators should resolve these disputes. Yet most concerns
regarding arbitrators' ability to interpret antidiscrimination
statutes are largely misplaced. As Elkouri and Elkouri
emphasize, labor arbitrators have long utilized Title VII and
other discrimination statutes to resolve discrimination claims. 10 7
For this reason, "qualified observers in the field of labor law and
arbitration" believe that arbitrators do have the requisite ability
to interpret and apply external law. 08
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)). Gilmer did not find such an intention in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. An intention to preclude arbitration has not been
uncovered in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending Title VII, or the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 881.
106. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52-54.
107. See ELKOURI & ELKonum, supra note 94, at 376.
108. Id. Of course the question whether arbitrators are capable of resolving
disputes by interpreting external law and whether they should be resolving such
disputes is a matter of great debate. The Supreme Court in Gilmer seems to have
resolved that debate, concluding that arbitration can be an appropriate forum for these
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Where external legal issues are raised, it would be beneficial
to both parties if the selected arbitrator was a lawyer or former
judge with experience in employment law. In a recent revision of
the American Arbitration Association's (AAA) rules, the AAA
stated that arbitrators who resolve employment disputes "shall
have familiarity with the employment field."'0 9 Even without
these precautions the selected arbitrator will likely have the
expertise the parties wish her to have. Because both parties
have an incentive to choose an expert in the employment law
field when a discrimination claim has been raised, their joint
decision to select a particular arbitrator should be respected.
Gilmer's approval of the use of arbitrators to resolve
discrimination claims, together with the arbitrators' proven
experience in deciding such claims, leaves little basis for
invalidating an arbitration agreement on the basis that the
arbitrator is unqualified to decide these issues. The argument
that arbitrators are qualified to decide statutory disputes is
especially compelling in the employment discrimination context,
where cases most often turn on factual not legal issues." ° Thus,
in employment cases, the effect on the underlying dispute of an
arbitrator's misunderstanding of the statute is minimized. In
addition, judicial review of the legal issues is always possible."'
disputes and that arbitrators are capable of resolving them despite the parties' limited
access to judicial review following an arbitral decision.
After studying "thousands" of arbitration opinions, the Elkouris conclude that
arbitrators are not only capable of understanding and applying external law, but that
"this capability probably equals and sometimes exceeds that of many courts, including
some federal courts." Id.
109. AMERiCAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES § 8(a)
(1993), available in 1993 WL 592205.
110. See Malin, supra note 15, at 104 ("Most employment disputes are fact-based
and not likely to raise the kind of legal issues that would call for significant judicial
review."). A study conducted in the 1980s found that discrimination claims involve
factual issues eighty-four percent of the time. See Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note
26, at 49, 53.
111. The standard for judicial review of grievance arbitration decisions is quite
deferential. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
599 (1960). Yet this deference is not unlimited. According to Enterprise Wheel, "[wihen
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation [to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement], courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of
the award." Id. at 597. While this standard dces not provide much opportunity for
review of an arbitrator's decision, in its language and intent it is quite similar to the
FAA's deferential standard for judicial review. The FAA permits reversal of the
arbitrator's award when the arbitrator has shown manifest disregard of the law or has
engaged in some type of egregious misconduct demonstrating fraud, corruption or
partiality. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(5) (1994). When the parties have agreed to resolve
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III. ARE "GARDNER-DENVER AGREEMENTS" INVALiD BECAUSE
"GILMER AGREEMENTS" REMAIN SUSPECT?
In evaluating the Gilmer decision, commentators have found
disturbing the Court's emphatic rejection of Gilmer's argument
that the existence of unequal bargaining power between an
employee and an employer should render that agreement
invalid."2 The Court stated that while validity of consent can be
examined on a case-by-case basis, only agreements that are the
result of fraud or overwhelming economic advantage would be
unenforceable." 3 Despite the Gilmer Court's forceful statement
on the matter, the question of whether unequal bargaining
power should invalidate an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims has remained unsettled.
The question is of continuing importance because of
unceasing calls for Gilmer's reversal on the basis that predispute
agreements to arbitrate are unfair to employees. The primary
basis for arguing that "Gilmer agreements" should be rejected is
that they are not entered into voluntarily. Voluntariness in this
context seems to be a euphemism for unequal bargaining power.
Legislators argue that the agreements are not voluntary because
the employee confronted with the agreement has no ability to
reject it or negotiate its terms." 4 The employee's inability to
make a legitimate choice stems from the fact that the agreement
their disputes using external law in the collective bargaining context, the standard of
review of the arbitrator's award would look remarkably similar. The main inquiry
would be whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the applicable external law.
Gilmer declared that the FAA's system of judicial review was sufficiently protective of
employee's statutory rights. Thus, it would seem logical to hold that the Enterprise
Wheel's system of judicial review is equally appropriate for review of statutory disputes
resolved in grievance arbitration.
112. See, e.g., Christine G. Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?--Some
Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.
203, 220-21 (1992); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 153
(1996).
113. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (citing
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
114. See 140 CONG. REc. S4266-03 (1994) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (attacking
predispute arbitration agreements because they are mandatory, as opposed to
voluntary); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1299 (9th Cir.
1994) (requiring "knowing and voluntary" consent before enforcement of executory
arbitration agreement); Sternlight, supra note 6, at 637. Some commentators reject the
theory that predispute arbitration agreements are not voluntary. According to Professor
Stephen Ware, for instance, such agreements are voluntary because the employee can
always choose not to accept the position. See Ware, supra note 3.
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is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and the employee has
no bargaining power to challenge the employer's provision. As a
result, the argument goes, the agreement is mandatory and
should not be enforceable.
115
Thus, a question arises: if Gilmer is ultimately reversed by
legislation, should that reversal have any effect on a proposed
overruling of Gardner-Denver? Regardless of Gilmer's fate,
Gardner-Denver should still be overruled. "Gilmer agreements"
are objectionable primarily because the parties who agree to
them have disparate negotiating incentives. Because the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement have similar negotiating
incentives, there is no basis for invalidating their agreement on
the basis of unequal bargaining power.
In fact, it is this difference that actually provides greater
reason to enforce "Gardner-Denver agreements" than "Gilmer
agreements." Application of game theory to both the Gilmer and
Gardner-Denver agreements highlights the important differences
between a "Gilmer agreement" and a "Gardner-Denver
agreement" and serves to explain why the perceived unfairness
of the "Gilmer agreement" is not present in cases involving
"Gardner-Denver agreements."
Arbitration of public law issues in a nonunion setting is
troubling because the structural protections inherent in
collective bargaining are not present.1 6 Unlike interactions in
the collective bargaining context, in which both the employer and
the union are regular participants in negotiation and arbitration,
only the employer is a "repeat player""7  in individual
employment arbitration. The employee, by contrast, is a one-shot
player."' An analysis of the interactions between one-shotters
and repeat players d.emonstrates that repeat players have a
115. See 140 CONG. REC 4267 (daily ed. April 13, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) ("It is simply unfair to require an employee to waive, in advance, his or her
statutory right to seek redress in a court of law in exchange for employment or a
promotion.").
116. See Cole v. Burns Intl Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
117. A repeat player is typically an organization that frequently interacts with a
particular institution or engages in certain behaviors, for example, commercial
transactions or labor-management negotiations. Representative repeat players include
unions and employers as well as large organizations like securities firms or insurance
companies.
118. A lack of organization and sophistication characterizes the one-shot player.
The one-shot player will usually have few opportunities to negotiate agreements and
even fewer opportunities to litigate a claim. The one-shot player's limited exposure to
negotiating and dispute resolution are defining aspects of his nature.
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distinct and systematic advantage in interactions with one-shot
players. 1 9
By contrast, the possibility of overreaching will rarely play a
part in negotiation and other interactions between repeat
players. In such interactions, external nonlegal interests, such as
each party's interest in maintaining a smooth working
relationship, together with equivalent negotiating power,
provides the incentive not to overreach.
A. The Repeat Player Interacting With the One-Shot Player:
Employer-Employee Negotiations
The repeat player's greater experience, expertise and
sophistication in contract negotiation will provide it significant
advantages in interactions with one-shot players. For instance,
in the dispute resolution context, the repeat player is likely to
have a much better understanding of the risks and benefits of
various dispute resolution mechanisms. Through this
understanding, the repeat player may be able to choose the
dispute resolution mechanism that best favors both parties, or
one that is more favorable to it. 120 A one-shot player, by contrast,
will be unable to evaluate intelligently the proposed clause,
because of a lack of experience in dispute resolution and
inadequate resources to investigate the benefits and drawbacks
of the clause.
The repeat player may also enjoy significant benefits during
the dispute resolution process. A greater understanding of the
process and an ability to influence that process through repeated
informal relations with the decisionmaker provides the repeat
player notable advantages. Moreover, the repeat player's
institutional memory will lead to more informed choices in
selecting an arbitrator.' The one-shot player will not have a
similar ability to influence the arbitrator and cannot afford to
keep track of different arbitrators' decisions.
Finally, the repeat player may benefit from the fact that one-
shot players, such as employees, tend to value improperly the
119. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476.
120. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual
Employment Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 254-55 (1983) (suggesting that in
the nonunion setting, employers are relatively free to draft the arbitration clause,
potentially unfairly narrowing the legal rights of the employees it will ultimately bind).
121. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476.
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inclusion of an arbitration agreement in an employment
contract. Employees suffer from judgmental bias as a result of
their personal experiences; 122 that is, they systematically ignore
or de-emphasize the likelihood that a low probability event will
affect them because the event has not occurred in the past. In
the employment context, this judgmental bias may cause an
employee to misapprehend the risk that he will engage in
litigation with his employer. This informational problem may
lead the employee to demand lower wages and fewer benefits
than if he was fully cognizant of the risks present in the
proposed arbitral agreement.
In the context of a relationship between an employer and an
employee, the employer's systematic advantage as a repeat
player over the one-shot-player employee manifests as follows:
Repeat players maintain their advantage during the negotiation
of the arbitration agreement because of their greater experience
and superior knowledge, as well as in the selection of the
arbitrator and in the arbitration itself.
1. Arbitration agreement negotiation
If repeat players use contracts in their negotiations with one-
shot players, they will attempt to maximize profits and benefits
from economies of scale by using standardized forms presenting
limited opportunity for negotiation of terms. When presented
with a standardized agreement, a one-shot player can only
attempt to gain concessions on the negotiable terms if he fully
appreciates the disadvantages or costs arising from the
nonnegotiable portions of the agreement. To appreciate the value
of the nonnegotiable terms, the employee would need to read and
understand the proposed agreement. 123  Yet the rational
employee will not invest substantial resources in reading or
analyzing a proposed agreement. Such behavior is rational
because the expected benefits from undertaking such an
122. Judgmental bias causes people to misassess the likelihood that a low
probability event will occur. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRISTics AND BIASES 462 (David
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
123. A repeat player who utilizes standardized forms neither expects nor wishes
for the one-shot player it deals with to read the agreements. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21:1 cmt. b (1979) ("A party who makes regular use of a
standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand
or even to read the standard terms.").
A FUNNY THING HAPPENED
investigation would be significantly outweighed by the costs
associated with such investigation. The expected benefits of
reading and understanding the agreement may be reduced even
further if the nonnegotiable terms concern the consequences of
unlikely occurrences and appear in small print and/or are
defined using obscure language.
124
Empirical evidence supports the theory that the rational
employee does not expend his limited resources reading and
analyzing terms other than wages or benefits. According to
David Charny, employees typically learn about crucial issues
such as dispute resolution mechanisms, job safety or
compensation a substantial amount of time after beginning
employment.125
By contrast, a rational repeat player will have included the
dispute resolution system of its choice in the employment
agreement with a one-shot player because it will have developed
an understanding of the different methods of dispute resolution
available and identified which method affords the greatest
benefit. The employer's greater understanding of the value of
such clauses, together with its ability to maximize its surplus by
determining which provisions should be included in the
agreement, will enable the employer to structure the
employment agreement in a way that furnishes it the most
advantage. 126 Moreover, the rational employer's position is
further enhanced by its ability to present the arbitration
124. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 241-43 (1995). Eisenberg explains that rational form readers will
remain ignorant of the terms because the cost of evaluating them is a waste of
resources and the likelihood of the clause's relevance is low. See id. Perhaps more
importantly, workers simply have other things on their minds. As one author put it,
"'people want to eat first and consider legal and philosophical implications later.'"
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1387
(1991) (quoting 2 Brecht, Dreigroschenoper [The Three Penny Opera], in GESAmEELTE
WERKE: STUCKE [Collected Works] 457 (1967)).
125. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARv. L. REV. 373, 417 (1990). Charny acknowledges that empirical evidence regarding
employees' knowledge about the jobs they accept and the reasons why they accept
them is sparse. Id at 417 n.144. Charny suggests that the evidence available indicates
that "workers are generally poorly informed and learn most relevant information only
after substantial experience at the job." Id. (citing W. KuP ViscusI, RISK By CHOICE 63-
69 (1986)); see also W. Kip Viscusi & Charles O'Connor, Hazard Warnings for
Workplace Risks: Effect on Risk Perceptions, Wage Rates, and Turnover, in LEARNING
ABouT RIsm CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 98, 101-09 (W.
Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat eds., 1987).
126. See Charny, supra note 125, at 418.
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agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If an employee actually
understands the arbitration provision and attempts to negotiate
the elimination of the :provision, the employer will simply refuse
and make a job offer to someone else.
An analysis of arbitration demonstrates that the process of
negotiation is not the only area where repeat players have the
potential to obtain significant advantage. 27 The employer's
repeat player status also creates a systematic bias in its favor in
the arbitration proceedings. The bias results from the employer's
incentive to foster relations with the arbitrator and create a
precedent system for tracking arbitration decisions.
2. Interaction with the arbitrator
An individual using arbitration to resolve disputes has the
incentive to compile information about potential arbitrators and
their past decisions and develop a relationship with those
arbitrators. The former will allow better predictability of arbitral
outcomes. The latter will potentially allow the individual to
influence the outcome of the arbitration. The employer's position
as a repeat player enables it to accomplish both of these goals.
It makes economic sense for the repeat player to monitor
arbitrators' decisions and acquire advance intelligence about
each arbitrator because it is likely that it will use that
information repeatedly in the future. Not surprisingly, it is
common for large organizations and law firms that represent
those organizations to keep databases containing extensive
background information on each potential arbitrator, including
how the arbitrator ruled in a number of cases, as well as the
quality of his decision."8
For the same reason, the repeat player will take the
opportunity to develop facilitative informal relations with the
127. See Cole v. Burns Int- Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Lewis
Maltby, Paradise Lost: How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4-5 (1994).
128. One large, management-side, labor law firm in Chicago maintains a database
that indicates whether an arbitrator found in favor of management or union, describes
the issue in dispute and offers the participating attorney's opinion regarding the quality
of the decision. Other resources containing information about arbitrators exist. The
Labor Arbitration Information Service (LAIS) provides information regarding an
arbitrator's past decisions, including the percentage of times the arbitrator has found
in favor of management and the union. The LAIS also indicates the arbitrator's
percentages in discipline and nondiscipline cases and then considers the arbitrator's
decisions individually, providing a summary of the subjects at issue in the arbitration.
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arbitrator, investing resources in attending events or
conferences where the arbitrator will be present in order to
establish a friendly relationship with the arbitrator that may
result in bias in favor of the employer in the future.129
A one-shot player who devoted any substantial time and
resources to obtaining information about arbitrators or
developing relationships with them would, by contrast, be acting
irrationally because he would never have use for the information
again.
30
The structure of the current arbitrator selection system does
not eliminate the one-shot employee's disadvantages. Quite to
the contrary, the current system provides significant benefits to
the employer, at the expense of the employee. The arbitrator is
likely to feel pressure to find in favor of the permanent party,
the employer, in most cases because industry members will more
frequently appear before the arbitrator. In addition, in many
employment arbitrations the employer pays the arbitrator's
entire fee.1 31 The sense that the employer "owns" the process as
a result may influence the arbitrator's ultimate resolution of the
129. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Chance, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95, 110-12 (1974).
130. Although potential plaintiffs would be acting irrationally if they attempted to
obtain similar information, the question is why a business or law firm has failed to
develop similar databases for plaintiffs' use. The response is simply that it would be
economically inefficient to expend the kind of resources necessary to obtain such
information unless there was some assurance that plaintiffs would choose to pay the
collector of the information for use of that information. In other words, as long as a
business or law firm would have no assurance that they would receive a return on
their investment, it would be irrational for them to compile such a resource. Employers
and their law firms, on the other hand, do have an incentive to compile such
information because a large employer will typically hire one law firm to handle all of
its employment lawsuits.
Similarly, there is little incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to collect and maintain a
database containing information about arbitrators. While such information would make
a plaintiff's lawyer more marketable and would allow him to increase his fees if the
information made her more successful, an investment in that information might not be
fiuitful because employees are one-shot players in the legal hiring world just as they
are in the dispute resolution world.
131. See Tia Schneider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace
Dispute Resolver, 49 DisP. RESOL. J. 48, 50 (1994). In a recent case, the D.C. Circuit
held that it is preferable to have employers pay for the entire process. See Cole, 105
F.3d 1465. The Cole court suggested that Gilmer might not have approved a program
of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the "absence of an agreement to pay
arbitrators' fees." Id. at 1484. Moreover, the Cole court rejected the theory that a
repeat player has the ability, if it pays for the process, to control it. The Cole court
stated, "[iut is doubtful that arbitrators care about who pays them, so long as they are
paid for their services." Id.
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case. An arbitrator who regularly finds in favor of complaining
employees may be sure that the employer will be reluctant to
rehire her in the future.
Thus, the employer maintains significant advantages over
the employee in structuring and executing a dispute resolution
clause.'32 On that basis, a persuasive argument can be made that
predispute arbitration agreements between employers and
employees should not be enforced." 3 Yet the Supreme Court
firmly rejected this argument in Gilmer, holding that, as a
general rule, statutory claims are subject to binding arbitration,
at least outside the collective bargaining context. Despite the
perceived unfairness such agreements generate, the arbitral
agreements of the unrepresented will be enforced.
B. The Repeat Player Interacting With the Repeat Player:
Union-Management Relations
As the D.C. Circuit recently acknowledged, arbitration in the
collective bargaining context is not as troubling as arbitration
between employers and individual employees because the
structure of the negotiation and arbitral process does not confer
benefits on one party at the expense of the other.' In union-
management relations, both parties are frequent participants, or
"repeat players" in negotiation and arbitration.
1. Drafting the arbitration agreement
The dynamics of the relationship between two repeat players
temper many of the defects present in the relationship between
132. Unrepresented employees suffer from an additional disadvantage: judgmental
bias. Judgmental bias causes individuals to misperceive the likelihood that an event
that rarely occurs and that they have never experienced will occur again in the future.
See Slovic et al., supra note 122, at 468. This bias, together with most people's belief
that they are immune from hazards, results in an inability to perceive accurately the
likelihood that a low probability event will occur. See id.
Applying the judgmental bias theory to the employment area yields the following
result: when the employee reviews his employment agreement and encounters an
arbitration clause that requires him to arbitrate all disputes arising out his
employment, his judgmental bias, developed from his personal experiences, is likely to
render him unable to place the proper value on the clause. In other words, the
employee is unable to value the clause properly because he will tend to discount the
probability that he will engage in a dispute with his employer. After all, he has never
had a dispute with an employer in the past and he knows that, in general, such
disputes happen to other people.
133. See generally Cole, supra note 22.
134. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476.
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a repeat player and a one-shot player. In repeat player
relationships, both actors should have similar experience and
expertise in negotiation and dispute resolution. Economies of
scale do not favor either party; nor does one party have a greater
understanding of the dispute resolution process than the other.
More importantly, in a transaction involving two repeat players,
both parties will have an economic incentive to avoid self-serving
behavior. In most instances nonlegal sanctions, such as the
desire to maintain a profitable business relationship with the
other party, induces the repeat player to keep its commitments.
These nonlegal sanctions, together with the awareness that both
parties have similar knowledge and access to information about
negotiation and dispute resolution, motivate the drafting party
to apportion fairly the agreement's surplus.
The drafting party creates the agreement with the
knowledge that an experienced negotiator will review it. As a
result, the party presenting the first draft is aware that drafting
an unfair or oppressive agreement may result in the kind of ill
will that might ultimately trigger the relationship's demise.
Further, even if the self-serving behavior went undetected
initially, the self-serving party would have difficulty dealing with
the other party throughout the life of the agreement and would
certainly face tough opposition in subsequent negotiations. Thus,
in drafting an agreement with another repeat player, the drafter
has the proper incentives both to draft an efficient contract, and
to distribute equitably the economic benefits.
In game theory terms, the strategy that motivates a repeat
player engaged in continued interactions with other repeat
players to avoid overreaching is the game of "tit for tat.""3 5 Using
the "tit for tat" strategy, a party's optimal strategy is to begin by
cooperating and continue to cooperate as long as one's opponent
does. If one's opponent engages in an act of betrayal, the affected
party should retaliate. This strategy discourages noncooperative
behavior while permitting a pattern of mutual cooperation to
develop. Thus, "tit for tat" is the best strategy in a repeat-move
game involving repeat players.3
Applying this theory to the union-management relationship
yields predictable results. First, the union is a repository of
135. See generally ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
136. Such strategy is not available to a one-shot player engaged in a transaction
with a repeat player because the one-shot player has only one opportunity to negotiate.
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information about both the benefits particular contractual terms
provide and the history of the negotiating relationship. The
employer has no incentive to propose a one-sided provision,
because it is quite probable that the union will fully appreciate
the disadvantages and costs associated with such a provision and
will reject it. Unlike the one-shot player who would be irrational
to invest substantial resources in reading and analyzing a
proposed agreement, it is perfectly rational for the union to read
and analyze each and every one of the provisions of a proposed
agreement. The equal bargaining power present on both sides
reduces the likelihood that either side will attempt to garner a
disproportionate benefit from the agreement. Moreover, if an
employer, for example, attempts to capture the surplus, the
union, as a repeat player, is capable of retaliating against the
breaching employer by playing "tit for tat" either during the life
of the agreement or du:ing the next round of negotiations.
Thus, both sides are conscious of the need to avoid
overreaching. Yet on those occasions when overreaching does
occur, repeat players -prefer not to engage in formal litigation
with each other. Because formal litigation might jeopardize their
ongoing relationship, the parties prefer an informal dispute
resolution method that is less disruptive and which elevates the
interest in maintaining the relationship over the need for a
"correct" resolution of the dispute. In most repeat player
relationships the preferred method of dispute resolution is
arbitration.
2. Dispute resolution between repeat players
A study of repeat player behavior establishes that arbitration
is the dispute resolution mechanism of choice for a repeat player
engaged in a dispute with another repeat player. 13 According to
Galanter, repeat players dealing with other repeat players have
the expectation that they are dealing and will continue to deal
with each other frequently.3 8 Because both parties are
interested in "continued mutually beneficial interaction," they
will prefer to use informal controls to govern their relations. The
use of informal controls is preferable because the potential loss
of their continuing relationship outweighs any official remedy
137. See Galanter, supra note 129, at 110.
138. See id.
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available.'39 Thus, as is quite well known in labor-management
circles, unions and employers prefer a dispute resolution form
"detached from official sanctions."14°
Arbitration provides just such detachment. Arbitration is
typically conducted in private. Moreover, the parties have
considerable freedom in designing the procedures governing
their arbitration because no formal rules govern the proceedings.
Because parties can customize the proceedings to suit their
interests, arbitration also has the potential for providing an
acceptable result at a low cost. As a result, arbitration limits
wealth transfers between parties, enabling the parties to retain
resources rather than expending them on lengthy litigation that
does not produce income for either side. Moreover, for repeat
players, it is irrelevant that errors may occur in determining the
outcome of a particular dispute, as long as no systematic bias
presents itself. Repeat players are aware that wealth effects
should balance out over the long term.
As repeat players, both union and management also have an
interest in avoiding the unsettling impact of constant litigation.
Because the two players raise their interest in a continuous
working relationship above the need for obtaining a correct
answer to a dispute, they prefer arbitration to litigation. As
Julius Getman noted: "[TIhe feeling that awards are likely to be
equalized over the long run and that erroneous awards can be
dealt with through negotiation, all have contributed to the
common labor-relations practice of routinely obeying awards,
even those that the losing side considers erroneous."' 4' The
method for dealing with awards that are perceived to be unfair
to the union or the employer is not reprisal or disobedience, both
of which might cause negotiation difficulties in the future, but
rather simply the decision not to hire the offending arbitrator
again in the future.
139. See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game
Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MicH. L. REv. 215, 281 (1990).
140. See Galanter, supra note 129, at 110.
141. Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J.
916, 922-23 (1979).
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Neither should the issue of judgmental bias present a
problem in union-management interactions.142 Because the union
is a professional negotiator, it will have engaged in frequent
dispute resolution and will understand fully the needs of its
constituents, the employees. Thus, the union is in a much better
position, in fact the same position as the employer, to resist the
judgmental biases that plague unrepresented employees. Thus,
there is no reason to suspect that unions are at a disadvantage if
they select arbitration as a means for resolving disputes. Rather,
the contrary is true; courts should presume that arbitration
protects the represented employee's rights, whether those rights
are contractual or statutory.
IV. CONCLUSION
Predispute arbitration agreements between employers and
employees are unquestionably enforceable following Gilmer v.
Interstate /Johnson Lane Corporation. By contrast, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to enforce similar agreements in the
unionized workplace, citingAlexander v. Gardner-Denver, for the
proposition that such agreements are not enforceable.
Over the past twenty years, however, the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have articulated an increasingly favorable
attitude toward the use of arbitration to resolve statutory
disputes. The Court has also repeatedly announced that the
arbitral forum is a perfectly adequate venue for the resolution of
statutory rights. This new vision of arbitration, when considered
in conjunction with the erosion of Gardner-Denver's foundation,
mandates a re-evaluation and reversal of Gardner-Denver. A
number of lower courts have already begun the movement,
placing collectively-bargained agreements to resolve statutory
disputes using external antidiscrimination laws on equal footing
with "Gilmer agreements." While some differences between the
two types of agreements remain, these are distinctions without a
difference that should be acknowledged as such and rejected.
Furthermore, even if Gilmer were ultimately overruled or
reversed by legislation because the employee's agreement to
arbitrate is viewed as involuntary and therefore unfair, Gardner-
142. See Charny, supra note 125, at 418 ("As a professional negotiator with an
inherently adversarial... stance, the union may resist the cognitive distortions that
may plague individual workers.").
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Denver should still be overturned because "Gardner-Denver
agreements" are unquestionably voluntary and the result of
exactly the kind of vigorous, two-sided negotiation that
eliminates questions of compulsion.
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